

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

January 24, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: W. White, Pantex Site Representative
SUBJECT: Pantex Plant Activity Report for Week Ending January 24, 2003

DNFSB Activity Summary: W. White was on travel to Sandia National Laboratories Wednesday and Thursday and was on site for the remainder of the week.

Fire Protection Basis for Interim Operation (FBIO): NNSA conducted its closure briefing to BWXT this week on the final results of the NNSA readiness assessment for implementation of controls in the FBIO. The assessment identified two items that required immediate resolution and nineteen issues that are being treated as post-start findings. The items that required immediate resolution were the following:

- Combustible material was staged under a work table in violation of a specific administrative control in the FBIO.
- The readiness assessment team observed multiple violations of programmatic administrative controls identified in the FBIO related to the control of combustible materials.

BWXT has taken actions to address these findings, and DNFSB staff observed the positive results of those actions in a review of procedural adherence issues earlier this month. The post-start findings addressed a wide range of issues. These include inadequate flow-down of authorization basis documents, failure to implement controls for Building 12-42, inadequacies in the safety basis database, inadequate resolution of issues identified during fire protection engineering evaluations, etc. PXSO expects to transmit a final report for this assessment (which was completed in late December) to BWXT early next week. [II.A]

W62 Contractor Readiness Assessment: BWXT completed its contractor readiness assessment for W62 seamless-safety (SS-21) operations this week. The assessment identified the following seven pre-start findings:

- There were administrative errors in receipt and inspection documentation for tooling.
- Combustible materials were not properly controlled.
- TSR requirements were not captured in maintenance surveillance documents.
- The W62 transition to operations plan identified the wrong approval authority for startup.
- Technicians did not always meet administrative controls for combustible loading.
- There were errors in the W62 procedures that prevented them from being performed as written.
- In two instances, technicians did not perform actions in accordance with procedures.

These findings, while stated in a general fashion above, tended to be limited to a very few specific observations of each item. There were also six post-start findings. The assessment team positively noted the formality of operations and the design of the new process. The team also noted that performance of the assessment in a training bay, while not optimal, was successfully accomplished. BWXT expects to send NNSA a declaration of readiness next week. [II.A]